Identifying Joint Employment Is as Easy as ABC by Peralta, Marc






In America’s current political climate, “Fight for $15” has become a 
common slogan among progressive activists.1  This political movement 
demands an increase of the federal minimum wage to fifteen dollars per 
hour.2  Under federal law, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) currently 
provides employees the right to a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.3  
Often overlooked in America’s political discourse, however, is the 
predicate for receiving such protections in the first place: the legal 
status of employment.4  Moreover, even when workers are nominally 
entitled to such protections, the material ability for workers to exercise 
such rights has been significantly undercut by businesses through 
elaborate means of shedding employment liability.5   
Both New Jersey’s Wage and Hour Law (NJWHL) and Wage 
Payment Law (NJPWL) protect a minimum wage for “employees.”6  For 
example, when one walks into an office building, one may presume 
reception workers, maintenance workers, or janitors are all employees 
of the company that owns or operates the building.  Such a presumption 
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 1 FIGHT FOR $15, https://fightfor15.org/c-petition/for-workers/ (last visited Nov. 
21, 2020). 
	 2	 Id. 
 3 29 U.S.C.S. § 206(a)(1)(c) (2020).  
 4 29 U.S.C.S. § 206(a) (2020) (“Every employer shall pay to each of his employees . . . 
.”) (emphasis added). 
	 5	 See,	e.g., DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY 
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 142 (2014). 
	 6	 See	 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a (2020) (establishing the minimum wage for 
“workers”). Hereinafter, “NJWPL” will refer to both the NJWPL and NJWHL collectively. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court held the employment test for both is the same due to 
their similarity of language. Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 312 (2015). 
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is increasingly incorrect.  There is an important caveat to the question 
of employment: in all employment statutes, the statutory language 
provides protection to “employees” and assigns liability for those 
protections to “employers.”7  Therefore, the analysis is actually two-fold.  
One side of the inquiry determines whether a worker is an employee or 
an independent contractor,8 while the other side asks who the putative 
employer is.9  It is this bifurcation of the employment analysis that 
presents the rub.  There are three major tests to determine employment 
liability: the common law “right to control” test, the “economic realities” 
test, and the “ABC” test.10  These tests determine the contours of 
“employment” in practice.  Generally, the touchstone of employment is 
control.11  Wage protection statutes, like the FLSA and the NJWPL, 
provide an even broader definition of employment: “to suffer or permit 
to work.”12  Early child labor prohibition statutes developed this 
particular language to prevent the circumvention of the prohibitions by 
utilizing third-parties as intermediaries.13  Based on this language, the 
economic-realities test has been developed by the circuit courts as an 
attempt to broaden the suffer-or-permit-to-work formulation of 
employment beyond the touchstone of control in interpreting the 
FLSA.14  The economic-realities test considers the “economic realities” 
of a potential employer-employee relationship to determine whether a 
worker follows the “usual path of an employee.”15  Unlike the FLSA, New 
Jersey has adopted the ABC test to determine a worker’s employee 
status under the NJWPL’s suffer-or-permit-to-work language.16  Under 
the ABC test, employment is presumed and an employer must prove 
three exhaustive and dispositive factors to disclaim employment 
liability: (1) a worker’s freedom from employer control; (2) that the 
 
	 7	 See,	e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a4(a) (2020) (“[E]ach employer shall pay to each 
of his employees . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
	 8	 See,	 e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(b) (2020) (an “employee” is “any person 
suffered or permitted to work by	an	employer, except that independent contractors and 
subcontractors shall not be considered employees.”) (emphasis added). 
	 9	 See,	 e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(a) (2020) (an “employer” is “any [person] 
employing any person . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
	 10	 See	infra Sections III.A, IV.A& B, respectively. 
 11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a). 
	 12	 Compare	29 U.S.C.S. § 203(g) (2020) with	N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1 (2020) and	
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a1(f) (2020). 
	 13	 See	Laurence E. Norton, II, Analyzing	a	Company’s	 “Joint	Employer”	Liability	 for	
Overtime	Pay	Under	Federal	and	State	Wage	and	Hour	Laws, 88 PA. B. ASS’N. Q. 10, 12-13 
(2017).  
	 14	 See	discussion infra Section IV..  
	 15	 See	generally,	Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727-29 (1947).	
 16 Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 316 (2015). 
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nature of work performed is outside of the employer’s usual course of 
business; (3) and that the worker’s profession will continue regardless 
of the employer’s business.17  The ABC test is generally considered the 
broadest of the three tests, providing the most protection to workers.18   
Despite New Jersey’s adoption of such a broad employment test, its 
effectiveness has been cast into serious doubt by a recent case from the 
New Jersey Appellate Division, Perez	v.	Access	Bio,	Inc.19  Under the joint-
employment doctrine, an employee may have multiple employers that 
are liable for her statutory employment rights.20  The court in Access	Bio	
held that the ABC test is limited to only the first inquiry of employment 
liability, whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor, 
and not to the second inquiry, who are the employers, in cases of alleged 
joint-employment.21  In order to identify multiple putative joint-
employers, the economic-realities test developed for the FLSA applies 
instead of the ABC test.22  Therefore, whether the ABC test or the 
economic-realities test applies depends on where a putative employer 
stands in relation to other putative employers and the putative 
employee.  This framework places the effectiveness of the ABC test, and 
the remedial purpose of New Jersey’s wage protection laws, in 
significant jeopardy.   
The stakes of employment status are high for both businesses and 
labor.  While employment protection laws like the FLSA or NJWPL are a 
boon to workers, they represent a corresponding liability and cost to 
employers.  In response, businesses have found increasingly novel and 
complex ways to “shed” their employment liability, while still benefiting 
from workers’ labor.  Firms achieve this by carefully structuring their 
organizations within the two-fold employment analysis.  The 
consequences of this “workplace fissuring” can be devastating to 
workers.  Fissuring schemes create a race to the bottom among the 
labor-providing third-party firms.  As labor is pushed further away from 
leading firms, the market becomes increasingly fractious and 
competitive.  Competition drives down the overall cost of labor, as well 
as third-party firms’ ability to comply with employment laws and 
remain profitable.  In addition, the sheer volume of small third-party 
firms makes employment law difficult to enforce.  The Access	Bio court’s 
 
	 17	 Id. at 305-06. 
	 18	 See,	e.g.,	id.	at 314-15. 
	 19	 See,	 Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17 
(Super. Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2019). 
 20 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.04 (2015); 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2020). 
	 21	 Access	Bio, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17. 
	 22	 Id.	(At least in circumstances in which one party stipulates employer status.), see	
also	infra Section A. 
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limitation of the ABC test to single employment cases leaves a 
considerable gap for workplace fissuring arrangements to fall into, and 
severely limits workers’ means for redress.   
This comment will argue for overruling Access	Bio and expanding	
the ABC test to joint-employment cases under the NJWPL.  Part II will 
discuss in greater detail the different forms of fissured workplaces and 
the resulting structural pressures that lead to employment violations.  
Part III will review the historical development of the NJWPL’s suffer-or-
permit-to-work definition of employment.  Part IV will elaborate on the 
framework of both the economic-realities test and the ABC test.  Finally, 
Part V will argue why Access	Bio’s holding limiting the ABC test to single-
employment cases is incompatible with the statutory language and 
purpose of the NJWPL and why the ABC test should be expanded to 
joint-employment cases.   
II. THE MATERIAL STAKES OF THE SHIFTING WORKPLACE 	
A. Purveyors	of	Labor:	How	Leading	Firms	Shed	Employment	
Liability	
The relationships between businesses and workers have become 
more complexly layered than ever before.  Fundamental employment 
functions—hiring, evaluation, supervision, pay, or training—which 
would typically be done in-house, can now require multiple 
organizations to fulfill.23  This phenomenon has been dubbed 
“workplace fissuring.”24  Business organizations, like a rock with cracks 
in it, have been splitting over time.25  But workplace fissuring is a new 
name for an old phenomenon.26   
Sweatshop labor in the garment industry is one of the oldest forms 
of workplace fissuring.27  In a classic sweating system, manufacturers 
divide their production lines into discrete parts.28  These manufacturers 
outsource the different labor parts of the production line to sub-
contractors for lump sums,29 and “jobbers” then assemble the required 
 
 23 WEIL, supra note 5, at 3-4, 7. 
 24 WEIL, supra note 5, at 5, 7. 
 25 WEIL, supra note 5, at 7. 
 26 WEIL, supra note 5, at 7. (attributing workplace fissuring to the past three 
decades), 224 (recognizing garment sweatshops from the 1800s as one of the oldest 
forms of workplace fissuring). 
 27 WEIL, supra note 5, at 224. 
	 28	 See	Bruce Goldstein, et al., Enforcing	Fair	Labor	Standards	in	the	Modern	American	
Sweatshop:	Rediscovering	the	Statutory	Definition	of	Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 
997 (1999). 
	 29	 See id. at 1056-57. 
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labor for piecemeal wages to “sweat out” the difference between the 
lump sum contract payment and the actual wages paid by the contractor 
for production.30  Jobbers are typically workmen who have saved 
enough capital required to bid on contracts.31  The primary benefit for 
leading firms utilizing a sweating system is the externalization of labor 
costs onto third-party firms.32  By pushing the cost of labor into smaller 
and more competitive markets between jobbers, wages are squeezed 
tighter.33  Therefore, the cost of labor falls in turn.  Beginning with the 
rise of employment protections, particularly child labor laws, leading 
firms used workplace fissuring as a means to avoid employment 
liability.34  Along with the benefits of more competitive labor markets, 
third-party fissuring transforms these jobbers into sacrificial lambs, 
assuming the employment liability in place of leading firms.35   
Sweatshops can be classified into different types: the inside shop 
and the outside shop.36  The inside shop is conducted on the leading 
firm’s premises.37  Despite being on the leading firm’s premises, the 
workers are legally employed by some other middle-man contractor.38  
In contrast, the outside shop is not on the leading firm’s premises, but 
the labor conducted therein is for the leading firm’s production line and 
benefit.39  At bottom, the sweatshop, whatever its form, acts as an 
intermediary that insulates the leading firm from employment 
liability.40   
 
	 30	 See id. at 1056.  
	 31	 Id. 
 32 WEIL, supra note 5, at 224-26; see	also Goldstein, et al., supra	note 28, at 1056.  
 33 WEIL, supra note 5, at 224-26. 
 34 Goldstein, et al., supra	note 28, at 1014. 
	 35	 See,	e.g., Michael Grabell, The	Expendables:	How	the	Temps	Who	Power	Corporate	
Giants	 Are	 Getting	 Crushed, PROPUBLICA: TEMP LAND (June 27, 2013), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-expendables-how-the-temps-who-power-
corporate-giants-are-getting-crushe (“She said that after she returned to work from 
surgery in 2002, the compact-disc warehouse she worked at told her it could no longer 
employ her because she didn’t have [residency] papers. They directed her to a temp 
firm, she said, and a few years later, she returned to the same warehouse, [doing the 
same work,] still undocumented.”). 
 36 There are three identified categories of sweatshops, but, for the purposes of this 
comment, “family shops” will not be discussed. Goldstein, et al., supra	note 28, at 1057. 
 37 Goldstein, et al., supra	note 28, at 1057. 
	 38	 See,	 e.g.,	 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 724-26 (1947) 
(explaining defendant slaughterhouse’s argument that the plaintiff workers, despite 
working on the slaughterhouse premises, were contractually employed by another meat 
boner). 
 39 Goldstein, et al., supra	note 28, at 1058-59. 
 40 Goldstein, et al., supra	note 28, at 1059. 
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New developments in fissuring schemes have retained remarkable 
parallels to the sweating system.  Staffing agencies have risen in the past 
sixty years to fill a similar niche as the inside sweatshop.  In a similar 
way that the sweating system pushes labor costs and liability onto 
smaller entities, a staffing agency gives leading firms “flexibility” in their 
workforce.41  As one advertisement from Kelly Girl, one of the first 
prominent staffing agencies, put it: “[w]hen the workload drops, you 
drop her.”42  Staffing agencies act as intermediaries between leading 
firms and their workers.  When a staffing agency takes on all of the 
responsibilities as an employer of the leading firm’s laborers, leading 
firms can simply command the required number of “bodies” necessary 
for their needs.43  Besides the ability to command labor power at a whim, 
the staffing agency also takes on the liability of complying with 
employment regulations.44  These agencies recruit workers, pay wages, 
and withhold taxes.45  Despite the formal employment relationship 
between the worker and the agency, workers are sent out to a leading 
firm’s premises to provide only the leading firm with labor.46  Typical 
examples of labor provided range from vegetable cutting and fish 
cleaning to packaging and assembly.47  These workers form the 
productive backbone for such companies as Walmart, Macy’s, Nike, 
Philips, and Frito-Lay.48   
Franchises are another example of modern workplace fissuring.  
Although the parallels are not as stark as those between staffing 
agencies and inside sweatshops, some franchising industries form 
something akin to a floating outside workshop.  As an example, unlike 
the permanent premises of a typical jobber’s outside shop, janitorial 
 
 41 Michael Grabell, The	Expendables:	How	the	Temps	Who	Power	Corporate	Giants	Are	
Getting	 Crushed, PROPUBLICA: TEMP LAND (June 27, 2013), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-expendables-how-the-temps-who-power-
corporate-giants-are-getting-crushe. 
	 42	 Id. 
	 43	 See	generally,	Grabell, supra	note 41 (“[A woman] goes to the counter and asks the 
dispatchers if they think there will be work today. They tell her there’s not much but to 
wait a little longer in case a company calls to say they need more	bodies.”) (emphasis 
added). 
	 44	 See,	 e.g.,	Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *2-3 
(Super. Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2019) (holding that staffing agency, not a leading firm 
pharmaceutical manufacturer, to be employer of temporary workers despite work 
occurring primarily within manufacturing plant and temporary employee tenures of 
multiple years). 
	 45	 Id. 
 46 Grabell, supra	note 41. 
 47 Grabell, supra	note 41. 
 48 Grabell, supra	note 41. 
PERALTA  (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2021  3:07 PM 
2021]	 COMMENT 267 
franchises move workers from client to client.49  A franchise is a large 
and well-known brand, such as Jan-Pro or Coverall, that does not 
provide labor directly to customers.50  Instead, the franchisor sells the 
franchise to an “entrepreneur” to own and operate as a separate legal 
entity from the franchisor.51  This sale includes giving the franchisee 
access to the franchisor’s brand name, an initial customer list, training 
in the franchisor’s cleaning methods, supplies and equipment, and 
“advice and counseling.”52  All of these benefits are purchased from the 
franchisor for an initial fee.53  The franchisee, acting as its own business, 
then provides the necessary labor to its customers.54   
Despite the franchisee’s legal distinction as a separate business 
from the franchisor, the primary business relationship exists between 
the franchisor and the customer.55  The franchisor, not the franchisee, 
coordinates and communicates with the franchisee’s clients.56  The 
franchisor bills the franchisee’s clients and then passes along the funds 
after deducting the relevant “Royalty Fee, Management Fee, Sales & 
Marketing Fee . . . and any other amounts due to [the franchisor].”57  The 
franchisee never receives money directly from its nominal clients.58  
Even where a franchisee finds new clients, they must be referred to the 
franchisor, who then sets the terms and conditions of the franchisee’s 
work for that client.59  Like the staffing agency and sweatshop, the 
franchise model allows the franchisor to shed employment liability.  
Unlike the staffing agency, the franchise utilizes multiple layers of 
separation.  In these cases, the actual janitorial workers, cleaning in 
various public facilities, warehouses, and professional offices,60 are 
separated from the businesses they labor for by at least two levels of 
fissuring.61  The janitorial workers are the contractual employees of the 
franchisee alone, not the franchisor, nor of the customers the workers 
labor for.   
 
	 49	 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 133-34. 
 50 WEIL, supra note 5, at 133-34. 
	 51	 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 133-34. 
 52 WEIL, supra note 5, at 134. 
 53 WEIL, supra note 5, at 134. 
 54 WEIL, supra note 5, at 136, fig. 6.2 (modelling the organizational structure of a 
major janitorial service franchise). 
 55 WEIL, supra note 5, at 135. 
	 56	 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 135. 
 57 WEIL, supra note 5, at 135. (quoting Jan-Pro Unit Franchise Disclosure Document, 
May 2010). 
	 58	 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 135.	
 59 WEIL, supra note 5, at 135. 
 60 WEIL, supra note 5, at 134. 
 61 WEIL, supra note 5, at 136, fig. 6.2. 
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B. Seismic	Consequences:	Workplace	Fissuring	Encourages	
Workplace	Violations	
Workplace fissuring benefits are far reaching.  Ancillary services to 
a firm’s “core competencies,” such as cleaning or security, are simply not 
in the firm’s best interest to manage themselves.62  The fissuring that 
occurs in the hotel sector are emblematic of this benefit.  The core 
competency of a hotel is the “experience” it provides to customers and 
the confidence any individual customer has in a hotel brand.63  Cleaning 
and other services are incidental to the primary driver of a hotel’s 
business.64  The skills required for such incidental services are typically 
low, which opens up opportunities for fissuring schemes like 
sweatshops, staffing agencies, or franchising services.65  Outsourcing 
these employment relationships can significantly reduce leading firms’ 
management expenses from hiring, firing, supervising, providing fringe 
benefits, and employment and labor law compliance.66   
The coal mining industry provides an illustrative example of how 
shedding employment liability can save significant operating expenses 
for leading firms.  Between 1980 and 1983, Island Creek Coal, a major 
coal mining firm, shifted from using unionized in-house labor to 
contracting out work for smaller and more dangerous mining jobs.67  
These smaller contractors took on all of the employment liability for the 
labor provided, including paying employment taxes, managing 
personnel, and contributing to unemployment and retirement funds.68  
By shedding employment liability, large mining companies, such as 
Island Creek, were estimated to save between three to five dollars per 
each ton of coal on average.69  In 1991, Island Creek reported production 
 
	 62	 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 49-50 
 63 WEIL, supra note 5, at 50. 
	 64	 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 50. 
	 65	 See	Goldstein, et al., supra	note 28, at 998. (Certain aspects of production can be 
labor intensive while not requiring skilled labor, therefore the key for leading firms 
becomes finding a steady supply of workers.). 
	 66	 See,	 e.g., Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *2-3 
(Super. Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2019);	Grabell, supra	note 41 (“. . . Never costs you for 
unemployment taxes and social security payments. . . . Never costs you fringe benefits.”). 
Another non-quantifiable benefit of shedding employment is the shedding of moral 
responsibility that employers owe to employees. By outsourcing labor, workers are 
tradeable like any other commodity, sight unseen, for the lowest possible price. Timothy 
Glynn, Taking	the	Employer	Out	of	Employment	Law?	Accountability	for	Wage	and	Hour	
Violations	 in	an	Age	of	Enterprise	Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 101, 114 
(2011).  
	 67	 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 104-05. 
 68 WEIL, supra note 5, at 102-04. 
 69 WEIL, supra note 5, at 103. 
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of nineteen million tons of coal.70  Assuming that its less desirable, 
subcontracted work consisted of only five percent of its total 
production, Island Creek saved between $2.9 million and $4.8 million 
that year.71   
This average cost savings says nothing to the shielding of leading 
firms from employment liability if a subcontractor goes bankrupt or 
violates employment law protections.  Even though Island Creek 
contracted mining work out to third parties, the union’s collective 
bargaining agreement required that the contractors hire Island Creek’s 
unionized workers.72  Of the sixty contractors that Island Creek Coal 
used for its less desirable mining operations, fifty-two went out of 
business.73  This left approximately $170 million in unpaid 
unemployment and retirement funds.74  Even though the workers were 
formerly unionized Island Creek employees, working in Island Creek 
owned or affiliated mines, Island Creek Coal was fully insulated from 
any liability to pay out the $170 million in missing funds.75   
While leading firms may benefit immensely from shedding 
employment liability onto smaller contractor middlemen, the 
consequences for workers—and society—can be devastating.  The very 
nature of fissuring schemes encourages employment law violations.76  
Returning to the janitorial franchising example, franchisee owners are 
typically led to believe that they can earn up to twenty-five dollars per 
hour from their clients.77  But, as earlier discussed, the franchisee does 
not set its own terms with clients.  Like a sweatshop jobber, the 
franchisor sets the prices to clients based on a service package rather 
than by the hour.78  Additionally, like sweatshop jobbers, the fractious 
nature of franchisees leads to intense price-based competition.79  This 
piecemeal pricing system ultimately leads to actual rates between 
 
 70 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PERFORMANCE PROFILES OF MAJOR ENERGY PRODUCERS 1992, 55 
(1994), available at  https://www.eia.gov/finance/archive/020692.pdf> (last visited 
Oct. 03, 2020). 
 71 In 2020 dollars, Island Creek Coal would save between approximately $5,544,238 
and $9,176,670. U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2020). 
	 72	 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 103. 
 73 WEIL, supra note 5, at 104. 
	 74	 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 104. 
 75 WEIL, supra note 5, at 104-05. 
 76 WEIL, supra note 5, at 131. 
 77 WEIL, supra note 5, at 137. 
 78 WEIL, supra note 5, at 137. (“For a small client who requires very basic janitorial 
services, contracts are often bid on the basis of a price per service visit.”). 
 79 WEIL, supra note 5, at 136. 
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approximately thirteen and seventeen dollars per hour in revenue.80  At 
these rates, it becomes structurally impossible for a franchisee to 
comply with minimum wage laws and simultaneously turn a profit.81  As 
workplace fissuring pushes the question of employment into the low 
end of the labor market, it creates fertile ground for employment 
violations.  Besides the usual problems of employment law enforcement 
due to the vulnerability of low-wage workers,82 enforcement at the low 
end of the labor market comes down to a game of Whac-a-Mole.83  In the 
janitorial services market, the price of entry is low while the labor pool 
is high, resulting in the growth of franchisees despite its inherent 
unprofitability.84  The small size and quick turnover of these types of 
firms allow them to fly under the radar.85  These smaller, fractured, and 
likely undercapitalized contractors are also likely judgment proof.86  
Like the Island Creek example, bankruptcy may prevent workers from 
receiving any meaningful redress for employment violations.  Thus, 
enforcement should not focus on the level of the third-party violators 
but on the fissured leading firms that drive the employment violations 
themselves.  One available tool for both workers and employment law 
enforcement is the doctrine of joint-employment, in which multiple 
firms can be held jointly liable for employment law compliance.87  The 
Access	Bio court’s limitation of the ABC test in the joint-employment 
context, however, severely hampers the ability to adequately address 
the wage violations under the NJWPL that are systematically driven by 
leading firms.  Overruling Access	Bio and expanding the ABC test to joint-
employment cases would place a powerful tool into the hands of 
workers themselves to materially protect their rights.88   
 
 80 WEIL, supra note 5, at 138, tbl. 6.2 (comparing the average per service piecemeal 
price of franchised janitorial services versus the estimated actual price per hour). 
	 81	 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 142. 
	 82	 See	Glynn, supra	note 66, at 110 (“ . . . the social and economic vulnerability of low-
wage workers, their lack of awareness of workplace rights, limited resources for public 
enforcement, limited remedies and other incentives for private enforcement, procedural 
hurdles, and the limited effect of unions and advocacy organizations.”). 
 83 WEIL, supra note 5, at 226. (focusing on contractor/subcontractor level of the 
garment industry led to a “seemingly endless cat-and-mouse game between the WHD 
and small-scale contractors”). 
 84 WEIL, supra note 5, at 140-41. 
 85 Glynn, supra	note 66, at 110. 
 86 Glynn, supra	note 66, at 110. 
	 87	 See,	e.g.,	29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2020). 
 88 Massachusetts shows signs of success for this method of holding at least 
franchisors accountable for franchisee wage violations using the ABC test.  See,	 e.g., 
Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80, 82-84 (D. Mass. 2010). 
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III. TO SUFFER OR PERMIT TO WORK	
A. The	Touchstone	of	Control:	The	Tort	Origins	of	Employment		
The common law concept of “employment” has agency law roots.  
Under agency principles, employment is just one form of a principal-
agent relationship.89  A principal is one who controls an agent that acts 
on the principal’s behalf.90  Although this sounds simple, not all 
principals are employers.91  Conversely, not all agents are employees.92  
An employer is specifically a principal of an employee.93  In general, 
agency law concerns itself with the principal’s liability for an agent’s 
conduct, such as entering into contracts with third parties.94  The legal 
distinction of employment, as opposed to other agency relationships, 
pertains to determining an employer’s vicarious tort liability for 
employees acting within the scope of employment, in other words, 
determining when an employer can be held liable for the actions of an 
employee.95  Since chains of vicarious liability are severed by 
independent action, the question of employment under agency law must 
be resolved using the right-to-control test.96   
The right-to-control test focuses on whether an employer has the 
right to control the “manner and means” of an employee97, i.e., the 
physical conduct of an employee’s performance.98  The test as applied 
must consider the totality-of-the-circumstances with a non-exhaustive 
list of important, but not necessarily dispositive, factors.99  These factors 
may include the physical control that can be exercised by the putative 
employer; the nature of the service performed; the skill required for the 
work; the length of service; and the terms of compensation.100  It is 
important to reiterate, however, that agency law specifically deals with 
the extension of tort liability and the power of an agent to bind a 
 
 89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2006). 
	 90	 Id. 
	 91	 See,	e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 14N cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2006). 
 92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 1.01 cmt. c. 
	 93	 Id. § 7.03(2). 
 94 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §§ 7.03-7.08. 
 95 Also referred to as the doctrine of respondeat	 superior. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY, § 7.03 et	seq.	
	 96	 Id. § 1.01 cmt. f(1). See	also	Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 307-08 (2015) 
(referring to the common law agency approach as the “right to control” test). 
	 97	 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 307.  
	 98	 See	 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 14N (Independent contractors are not 
employees.). 
	 99	 Id. § 220(2). 
	 100	 Id.; see	also	RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 1.02.  
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What does it mean to “employ” under employment laws?  Most 
employment statutes do not provide an express definition of 
“employment” or “employee.”103  Moreover, even where such definitions 
are provided they are often circular.104  In light of this, the Supreme 
Court has provided that the common law right-to-control test 
presumptively applies unless otherwise defined in a relevant statute.105  
Although the FLSA has a circular definition of “employer” and 
“employee,” it stands unique among federal employment statutes.106  
The FLSA bridges the gap between employer and employee with its 
definition of “employ,” which “includes to suffer or permit to work.”107  
State wage protection laws, like the NJWPL, emulate the FLSA’s suffer-
or-permit-to-work language in its definition of “employee.”108  In terms 
 
 101 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, §§ 7.03-7.08; see	also, Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J. concurring) 
(discussing the origins of “employment” in the context of agency law as simply a means 
to determine where a chain of vicarious tort liability ends). 
	 102	 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1544 (Easterbrook, J. concurring) (“The reasons for 
blocking vicarious liability at a particular point have nothing	to	do with the functions of 
the FLSA.”) (emphasis added). 
 103 James Reif, ‘To	Suffer	or	Permit	to	Work’:	Did	Congress	and	State	Legislatures	Say	
What	They	Meant	and	Mean	What	They	Said?, 6 NE. UNIV. L. J. 347, 350 (2014). 
	 104	 Id. at 350 n.1 (“The following are examples of federal laws that do not include a 
definition of ‘employ’ but do contain a circular or otherwise unhelpful definition of 
‘employee’”)’ National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C.S. 152(3) (2011) (providing 
that ‘[t]he term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . .’); Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1972, 29 U.S.C.S. 1002(6) (2011) (‘employee’ defined as ‘any 
individual employed by an employer’); Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 
U.S.C.S. 652(6) (2010) (‘employee’ defined as ‘an employee of an employer who is 
employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce,’ even while ‘employ’ is 
not defined).”). 
 105 TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & RACHEL ARNOW-RICHMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: 
PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATION 6 (4th ed. 2019). 
	 106	 Compare 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(d) (2020) (“‘Employer’ includes any person acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . .”), with 
29 U.S.C.S. § 203(e)(1) (“[T]he term ‘employee’ means any individual employed by an 
employer.”). 
	 107	 Compare 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(g), with 29 U.S.C.S. § 152(3) (2011), and 29 U.S.C.S. § 
1002(6) (2011), and 29 U.S.C.S § 652(6) (2010).  
 108 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(b) (2020) (“‘Employee’ means any person suffered	or	
permitted	 to	 work by an employer, except that independent contractors and 
subcontractors shall not be considered employees.”) (emphasis added). 
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of plain language, suffer-or-permit-to-work provides the broadest 
definition of employment, and therefore requires something other than 
the right-to-control test.109  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
“a broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees . . . would be 
difficult to frame.”110  The formulation of the language has a long history 
in contemplating relationships outside the right-to-control test for 
employment.111  As will be discussed below, over the past one hundred 
years of interpreting suffer-or-permit-to-work employment, different 
tests have been applied to determine the definition’s outer limit.   
Suffer-or-permit-to-work was originally formulated to eradicate 
the evils of child labor.112  In the seminal case People	ex	rel.	v.	Sheffield	
Farms‐Slawson‐Decker	Co., the New York Court of Appeals interpreted 
New York’s child labor law that used “suffer or permit to work” to define 
employment.113  The alleged employer-defendant was a milk delivery 
business.114  One of the defendant’s delivery drivers paid a thirteen-
year-old boy to prevent theft of the driver’s bottles in violation of New 
York’s child labor law.115  The court held that the defendant milk 
delivery business was equally liable for the child labor violation as the 
employee delivery driver who hired the boy.116  The court held that the 
defendant employer had a duty to reasonably inquire into the 
conditions of its business and failed to prevent the illegal child labor.117   
The Sheffield	 Farms	 court articulated several fundamental 
principles in interpreting New York’s child labor law that are still 
applied in the child labor context today.118  First, and most importantly, 
Judge Cardozo interpreted the words of the statute in their common 
meaning: “Permission, like sufferance, connotes something less	 than	
consent. Sufferance, like permission, connotes some opportunity	 for	
 
	 109	 See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947); see	also, Sec’y 
of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Easterbrook, J. concurring) (“The definition, written in the passive, sweeps in almost 
any work done on the employer’s premises, potentially any work done for the 
employer’s benefit or with the employer’s acquiescence.”). 
 110 United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945). 
 111 Norton, supra	note 13, at 12-13. 
	 112	 See	id. 
 113 People ex rel. v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 30-31 (1918). 
	 114	 Id. at 27-28. 
	 115	 Id. 
	 116	 Id. at 29-33. 
	 117	 Id. 
	 118	 See,	 e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 570.113(a) (2020) (articulating the same principles as 
Sheffield	Farms in interpreting the FLSA’s own child labor provision). 
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knowledge.”119  This interpretation is the foundation for the two-factor 
test that has become the basis for the FLSA’s own interpretation of 
suffer-or-permit-to-work under its child labor provisions: (1) whether 
an employer knows or should have known that a child is performing 
work for the employer, and (2) whether an employer acquiesced or 
failed to prevent the child from performing work.120  Moreover, this 
construction of “suffer or permit to work” inherently implicates liability 
for multiple employers: 
[The law] is directed primarily against the employer, and only 
secondarily against others as they may aid	and	abet	him. He 
must neither create nor suffer in his business the prohibited 
conditions. The	command	is	addressed	to	him. Since the duty is 
his, he	may	not	escape	it	by	delegating	it	to	others. He breaks 
the command of the statute if he employs the child himself. He 
breaks it equally if the child is employed by agents to whom 
he has delegated “his	own	power	to	prevent.”121  
 
The Sheffield Farms test went all the way to the top, considering the 
employee who hired the boy as someone that “aided or abetted” the 
leading milk delivery business in utilizing child labor.122  Although 
Sheffield	Farms	does not expressly reject the right-to-control test in this 
context, it does expressly reject the tort conception of employment 
under the suffer-or-permit-to-work paradigm: “[This case] is not an 
instance of respondeat	superior. It is the case of the non-performance of 
a non‐delegable	duty.”123   
Other courts applied the principles laid out in Sheffield	Farms	 to 
employment fissuring schemes utilizing independent contractors as 
third-party labor middlemen.124  In Commonwealth	v.	Hong, the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts found that the use of an independent contractor 
as a middleman to hire an underage performer did not	 relieve the 
business of employment liability under suffer-or-permit-to-work 
employment.125  In virtually every case involving a child labor violation 
by an independent contractor, courts have held leading firms liable 
where the leading firm had an opportunity for knowledge of, and failed 
 
 119 People ex rel. v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 31 (1918) 
(emphasis added). 
	 120	 See 29 C.F.R. § 570.113(a) (2020). 
	 121	 Sheffield	Farms, 225 N.Y. at 29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
	 122	 See id. 
	 123	 Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 
	 124	 See Goldstein, et al., supra	note 28, at 1043 (discussing Commonwealth v. Hong, 
158 N.E. 759 (Mass. 1927)). 
 125 Commonwealth v. Hong, 158 N.E. 759 (Mass. 1927). 
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to prevent, the independent contractor from using child labor on the 
leading firm’s behalf.126  Therefore, it becomes clear from Sheffield	
Farms	 and	 its progeny that suffer-or-permit-to-work necessarily 
implicates joint-employment.  As Judge Cardozo held: “[An employer] 
must . . . stand or fall with those whom he selects to act for him.”127   
IV. A SQUARED CIRCLE: THE DILEMMA OF TWO TESTS FOR 
EMPLOYMENT  
Under the NJWPL an “employee” is “any person suffered or 
permitted to work	 .	.	.	 except that independent contractors and 
subcontractors shall not be considered employees.”128  The NJWHL not 
only defines “employer” and “employee,” but also defines “to employ,” 
which includes “to suffer or permit to work.”129  Likewise, the FLSA’s 
definition of employment “includes to suffer or permit to work.”130  Yet 
the state and federal versions, despite their similar statutory language, 
employ two different tests.131  The FLSA applies the so-called “economic 
realities” test, which was handed down by the Supreme Court in the 
seminal case Rutherford	Food	Corp.	v.	McComb, which the circuit courts 
have further developed.132  On the state level, New Jersey applies the 
ABC test for interpreting the NJWPL’s suffer-or-permit-to-work 
language, at least for cases involving a single putative employer.133  But 
 
 126 Goldstein, et al., supra	note 28, at 1043-44. 
 127 People ex rel. v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 30 (1918) The 
Department of Labor still uses this construction in its interpretation of 29 U.S.C.S. § 
212(c) (2020). See 29 C.F.R. § 570.113(a) (2020). 
 128 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(b) (West 2020). 
 129 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a1(f) (West 2020). The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
held that because of the similar statutory language of the NJWPL and NJWHL, the ABC 
test was equally appropriate for determining “employee” status under either. Hargrove 
v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 312 (2015). 
 130 29 U.S.C.S § 203(g) (2020). 
	 131	 Compare	 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 316 (applying the ABC test), with	 Donovan v. 
DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1385 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying a version of the 
economic-realities test, dubbed the “Sureway	Cleaners	 test,” developed by the Ninth 
Circuit in  Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981)).	
 132 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726-27 (1947) (this case is also 
the first, and only, Supreme Court decision dealing with the doctrine of joint-
employment under the FLSA); See	also	Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 310-11 (referring to the 
“economic realities” test developed for interpreting the FLSA); Reif, supra	note 103, at 
353 (Circuit Courts have primarily developed the economic-realities test based on the 
Rutherford	factors.). 
	 133	 See	 generally	Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 289; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 12:56-16.1 (2020) 
(regulation providing that the ABC test as found in New Jersey’s Unemployment 
Compensation Law be used to interpret the NJWPL.). See	also discussion infra Section V 
(arguing that the New Jersey Appellate Division’s holding in Perez	 v.	Access	Bio,	 Inc. 
changes the analysis when dealing with multiple putative employers). 
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in the recent case Perez	 v.	Access	Bio,	 Inc., the New Jersey Appellate 
Division held that the NJWPL actually applies each test, depending on 
the number of putative employers.134   
The definitions of both employer and employee under the NJWPL 
implicate the other.135  Despite their intertwined nature, the two 
definitions of “what is an employee” and “what is an employer” creates 
a bifurcated analysis of employment law liability.  Therefore, the first 
inquiry is concerned with the nature of the employment relationship 
and whether a given worker is an employee or independent 
contractor.136  Only employees are entitled to protections provided by 
employment statutes.137  If the worker is an employee of someone, the 
next inquiry must identify who are the liable employers.138  Under the 
doctrine of joint-employment, an employee may have multiple 
employers who are liable for employment law compliance.139   
The New Jersey Appellate Division in Access	 Bio	 held, “the 
[Hargrove] Court did not make its holding . . . applicable to all 
employment status disputes under the WHL . . . , but rather focused on 
the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor.”140  
Therefore, Access	Bio has bounded the ABC test within that first inquiry 
of employment liability.141  When determining joint-employment under 
the NJWPL, the second inquiry, who are the employers, may apply the 
economic-realities test or the ABC test, depending on where the putative 
employers stand in relation to each other and the putative employee.142  
Upon careful examination, however, such a standard proves 
 
	 134	 See	Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17 (Super. 
Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2019). See	also discussion infra Section V (interpreting the Access	
Bio court’s holding).  
 135 An “employer” is “any [person] employing any person . . . .” An “employee” is “any 
person suffered or permitted to work by	 an	 employer, except that independent 
contractors and subcontractors shall not be considered employees.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
34:11-4.1(a)-(b) (West 2020) (emphasis added). 
 136 Glynn, supra	note 66, at 109. 
 137 GLYNN, supra note 105, at 3-6; see	also Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 
416 P.3d 1, 5 (2018) (discussing the stakes of improper employment classification). 
 138 Glynn, supra	note 66, at 109. 
 139 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.04 (2015); 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) 
(2020). 
 140 Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16 (Super. Ct. 
App. Div. July 23, 2019)  (emphasis added). 
 141 The court in Curry	 v.	Equilon	Enterprises,	LLC, reasoned similarly, limiting the 
application of the ABC test to cases determining if a worker is an employee or 
independent contractor to a single putative employer. 23 Cal. App. 5th 289, 314 (2018). 
	 142	 See Access	Bio, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17.	Both the Curry	and Access	Bio courts 
did not address how the ABC test would apply in a case contemplating multiple 
employers where one party did not stipulate its employer status. 
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unworkable outside the specific facts of Access	 Bio.  In order to 
understand why, the two tests must be compared in greater detail.   
A. The	Economic	Realities	Test	
In the landmark case, Rutherford	 Food	 Corp.	 v.	 McComb, the 
Supreme Court first decided what constitutes employment under the 
FLSA’s suffer-or-permit-to-work definition for claims of wage and hour 
violations.143  The Court acknowledged that the FLSA’s broad 
employment definition captures more relationships than the common 
law right-to-control test.144  The Court also recognized the unity of the 
suffer-or-permit-to-work definition between the wage, hour, and child 
labor provisions, as well as the language’s child labor prohibition 
antecedent.145  Despite this recognition, the Court found that suffer-or-
permit-to-work did not provide a limit to the employer-employee 
relationship, and did not engage at all with either an “opportunity for 
knowledge” or “the power to prevent” that was articulated in Sheffield	
Farms.146  Instead, the court adopted the Tenth Circuit’s approach in 
determining whether sub-contractor meat boners under a supervisor 
meat boner were actually the employees of the slaughterhouse itself.147   
The Tenth Circuit found that the sub-contractor meat boners were 
indeed employees despite only being contractually employed by their 
meat boner supervisor—a classic joint-employment case.148  The Tenth 
Circuit held that the “underlying economic realities” showed that the 
meat boners were an “integrated economic unit” of the 
slaughterhouse.149  The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that workers 
who follow the “usual path of an employee” are covered by the FLSA.150  
The Court provided the maxim: “the determination of the relationship 
does not depend on . . . isolated factors but rather upon the 
circumstances of the whole	activity.”151  The Court listed factors that it 
found persuasive in upholding the Tenth Circuit’s ruling: 
[T]he workers did a specialty job on the production line. The 
responsibility under the boning contracts without material 
changes passed from one boner to another. The premises and 
equipment of Kaiser were used for the work. The group had 
 
 143 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947). 
	 144	 Id. at 728-29. 
	 145	 Id. 
	 146	 See	id. at 728. 
	 147	 Id. at 726, 27, 31. 
	 148	 Id. at 727. 
 149 Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 726-27. 
	 150	 Id.	at 729. 
	 151	 Id. at 730 (emphasis added). 
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no business organization that could or did shift as a unit from 
one slaughterhouse to another. The managing official of the 
plant kept close touch on the operation. While profits to the 
boners depended upon the efficiency of their work, it was 
more like piecework than an enterprise that actually 
depended for success upon the initiative, judgment or 
foresight of the typical independent contractor.152 
 
Since ruling on Rutherford in 1947, the Supreme Court has not 
provided additional substantive guidance on the FLSA’s employment 
definition or on any other suffer-or-permit-to-work employment 
statutes.153  Accordingly, the circuit courts have primarily developed the 
economic-realities test.154  Due to the totality-of-the-circumstances 
nature of the economic-realities test and the lack of legal principle for 
determining the “usual path of an employee,” any given FLSA case can 
apply different weight to each factor.155  The circuit courts have 
generally agreed, however, that the factors considered are neither 
dispositive nor exhaustive.156  In developing the economic-realities test 
through the prism of Rutherford, two common principles emerged to 
determine whether an employment relationship exists: functional 
control and dependence.   
1. Functional Control 
Circuit courts frequently cite to Rutherford	 as the basis for the 
factors the court will consider.157  In particular, circuit courts have 
focused on the fact that the slaughterhouse manager in Rutherford 
frequently kept in close contact with the meat boners.158  Because the 
economic-realities test as formulated supposedly goes beyond the right-
 
	 152	 Id. 
 153 Reif, supra	note 103, at 352-53; but	see	Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 
366 U.S. 28, 32-33 (1961) (In a brief opinion, the Supreme Court applied “suffer or 
permit to work” in a single-employer context and found that cooperative stakeholders 
were also employees of the cooperative under FLSA because the cooperative as an entity 
provided the stakeholders “an opportunity to work, and [paid] them for it.” The Court 
makes absolutely no	mention of the right-to-control.). 
 154 Reif, supra	note 103, at 353. 
	 155	 See	Reif, supra	note 103, at 354. 
 156 Reif, supra	note 103, at 370-71; see	also	 Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. 
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J. concurring) (“Certain 
criteria have been developed to assist in determining the true nature of the relationship, 
but no criterion is by itself, or by its absence, dispositive or controlling.”). 
	 157	 See,	e.g., Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985). 
	 158	 See,	e.g., Zheng, 355 F.3d at 70. 
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to-control, circuit courts that apply factors related to control distinguish 
between formal control and something akin to “functional control.”159   
For example, in Ling	Nan	Zheng	v.	Liberty	Apparel	Co., the Second 
Circuit rebuked the trial court for adopting a test that focused too 
narrowly on formal control in determining whether the defendant-
garment manufacturer was the joint-employer of garment workers who 
were unquestionably employed by a contractor-middleman.160  Instead, 
the Second Circuit identified six factors for the trial court to apply on 
remand: (1) whether the premises were owned by the putative 
employer, (2) whether the contractor-middleman could move from one 
leading firm to another, (3) the extent to which the workers’ labor was 
integral to the putative employer’s production line, (4) whether the 
workers’ contracts could pass to new workers without material 
changes, (5) the degree of supervision by the putative employer’s 
agents, and (6) whether the workers predominantly labored on behalf 
of the putative employer.161  The Second Circuit stated that the six 
articulated factors would reveal a level of “functional control” that 
would justify finding joint-employment despite not falling within the 
common law conception of control.162   
Similar to the Zheng court, the Third Circuit in In	re	Enterprise	Rent‐
A‐Car	Wage	&	Hour	Employment	Practices	Litigation	adopted a posture 
that predominantly focused on control.163  Instead of “functional 
control,” the Third Circuit stated that joint-employment exists where 
additional employers exert “significant control.”164  The court took the 
position that joint-employment only exists where other putative 
employers share governance over the “essential terms and conditions of 
employment.”165  From a plain language perspective, “significant 
control” seems to be an even narrower standard than “functional 
control,” but the court then qualified that “[u]ltimate control is not 
necessarily required[,] . . . even ‘indirect’ control may be sufficient.”166  
With these principles in mind, the Third Circuit provided four factors 
that consider whether the putative joint-employer can: (1) hire and fire 
workers, (2) control the conditions of employment, (3) supervise the 
worker’s day-to-day labor, and (4) control the worker’s records (such 
 
	 159	 See	generally, e.g., Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69; In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour 
Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2012). 
	 160	 Zheng,  355 F.3d at 69. 
	 161	 Id.	at 72. 
	 162	 Id. 
	 163	 Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 468. 
	 164	 Id. 
	 165	 Id. 
	 166	 Id. 
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as payroll, insurance, and taxes).167  Although the Second Circuit and 
Third Circuit provided different factors, both courts acknowledged that 
neither list is dispositive or exhaustive.168   
2. Dependence 
Another common principle articulated by the circuit courts is 
“dependence.”  In Donovan	v.	DialAmerica	Marketing,	Inc.,169 the Third 
Circuit, in a single-employment context, listed six factors to determine 
whether a worker is “dependent upon the business to which they render 
service,” such that it would justify a finding of employment.170  The Third 
Circuit analyzed the following six factors: (1) the degree of control by 
the business over the manner and means of the worker’s service, (2) the 
worker’s opportunity for profit and loss, (3) the worker’s investment in 
equipment or material required for the services provided (including 
hiring helpers), (4) any special skills required for the service, (5) the 
permanence of the relationship, and (6) whether the service was an 
integral part of the putative employer’s business.171  The principle of 
“dependence” in DialAmerica primarily relied on the last two factors.172  
The court contemplated that a worker who is “economically dependent” 
upon a putative employer cuts toward an employment relationship.173  
But this principle is not based upon a worker’s dependence on 
employment as a primary source of income.174  The court reasoned that 
such a construction would be both over and under-inclusive.175  
Therefore, the court focused on the permanence of the service provided 
rather than the monetary compensation received.176   
The Third Circuit also limited the dependence factor by 
determining whether the worker’s services are economically integrated 
into the putative employer’s business.177  Whether the work was 
“economically integrated” into the putative employer’s business would 
supposedly reveal whether a worker was capable of “transfer[ring] 
 
	 167	 Id. at 469. 
	 168	 Id.	at 469; Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 169 Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc.,	757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985). 
	 170	 Id. at 1382-83.	
	 171	 Id. at 1382 (citing Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 
1981)). 
	 172	 See id. at 1385. 
	 173	 Id. 
	 174	 Id. 
	 175	 See DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1385 n.11 (providing a hypothetical to illustrate that 
such an interpretation of dependence, “would lead to senseless results if carried to its 
logical conclusion”). 
	 176	 Id. at 1385-86. 
	 177	 See id. at 1385. 
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their services from place to place, as do independent contractors.”178  It 
is important to note, however, that even though this particular case 
focused on the worker’s dependence on the putative employer for 
continued employment, the other factors the court considered material 
to the analysis included aspects of control.179   
B. The	ABC	Test	
Despite the similarity of many states’ suffer-or-permit-to-work 
wage protection statutes to the FLSA, a different employment test has 
been developed at the state level.180  In Hargrove	v.	Sleepy’s,	 Inc., the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the ABC test should be used to 
determine employment under the NJWPL’s suffer-or-permit-to-work 
framework.181  Under the NJWPL, an employee is defined as “any person 
suffered or permitted to work by an employer . . . .”182  The Hargrove 
court expressly rejected the right-to-control or economic-realities test 
as the proper analysis for employment liability under the act.183   
The ABC test stands in stark contrast to both the right-to-control 
test and the economic-realities test.  The ABC test requires a showing 
that employment characteristics are not present.184  Unlike the right-to-
control and economic-realities test, employment is presumed, with the 
burden of rebuttal falling to the putative employer to prove each 
factor.185  The New Jersey ABC Test provides: “[s]ervices performed by 
an individual for remuneration shall be deemed to be employment 
 
	 178	 Id.  
	 179	 See	id. at 1386. 
	 180	 Employee	or	Contractor?	The	Complete	List	of	Worker	Classification	Tests	by	State, 
WRAPBOOK (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.wrapbook.com/worker-classification-tests-by-
state/.  
 181 Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 295 (2015); see	also	Dynamex Operations 
W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 7 (2018) (adopting the ABC test to interpret suffer-or-
permit-to-work in California’s wage orders which regulate wage and hour violations 
similar to the NJWPL).	
 182 But such definition expressly excludes “independent contractors and 
subcontractors.” N.J. STAT. ANN § 34:11-4.1(b). Although the concept of “independent 
contractor” is rooted in the common law and would suggest a common law right-to-
control test, this language merely functions as an express exception to the broad 
coverage of the statutory language. In fact, the Dynamex court saw no conflict between 
the independent contractor distinction and “suffer or permit to work.” Dynamex, 416 
P.3d at 30. 
	 183	 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 314-15. But	see	Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 
2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17 (Super. Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2019) (limiting the ABC test to 
single-employment cases).	
	 184	 See	N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)-(C) (based in New Jersey’s Unemployment 
Compensation Law, which the Hargrove court formally adopted to interpret both the 
NJWPL and NJWHL pursuant to N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 12:56-16.1). 
	 185	 Hargrove,	220 N.J. at 314.	
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. . . .”186  Essentially, the employment presumption arises where a 
worker receives consideration for her labor.187  In order to overcome 
the presumption of employment, the putative employer must show: 
(A) Such individual has been and will continue to be free from 
control or direction over the performance of such service, 
both under his contract of service and in fact; and 
(B) Such service is either outside the usual course of the 
business for which such service is performed, or that such 
service is performed outside of all the places of business of the 
enterprise for which such service is performed; and 
(C) Such individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession or 
business.188 
If the employer fails to satisfy any of these factors, the individual 
performing services for remuneration qualifies as an employee of the 
putative employer.189  The ABC test represents a fundamental paradigm 
shift in determining employment status.190   
1. Freedom from Control 
By its plain language, the first factor, “A,” sweeps broadly; the 
putative “employer must show that it neither exercised control over the 
worker, nor	had	the	ability to exercise control in terms of the completion 
of the work.”191  The level of control necessary to establish employment 
does not have to be pervasive, “some level of control may be 
sufficient.”192  Control can be established by facts, such as: setting hours 
 
 186 N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6); see	also N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(p) (“‘Remuneration’ 
means all compensation for personal services, including commission and bonuses and 
the cash value of all compensation in any medium other than cash.”).  
	 187	 See	Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 314; see	also	N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6) (“Services 
performed by an individual for remuneration shall be deemed to be employment subject 
to this chapter (R.S.43:21-1 et seq.) unless . . . .”).	
 188 N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)-(C). 
	 189	 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 314. 
	 190	 See,	e.g.,	John Skousen,	New	ABC	Test	for	Independent	Contractors	Sends	California	
Employers	 Reeling, Resources, FISHER PHILLIPS (July 2, 2018),	
https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-newsletters-article-new-abc-test-for-
independent-contractors-sends;	Mike Kappel, The	End	of	an	Era?	How	the	ABC	Test	Could	
Affect	 Your	 Use	 of	 Independent	 Contractors, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2018, 9:10 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikekappel/2018/08/08/the-end-of-an-era-how-the-
abc-test-could-affect-your-use-of-independent-contractors/#719da0351f66. 
	 191	 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 305 (emphasis added). 
	 192	 Id.;	but	see Law Office of Gerard C. Vince, LLC v. Bd. of Review, No. A-5441-17T2, 
2019 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1846, at *8-9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sep. 3, 2019) (The court 
narrowed the A-prong control analysis, concluding that the basic supervision required 
of lawyers over paralegals to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct is not 
enough control to establish the A-prong. The court disapproved of and rejected the 
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or jobs; the reservation of a right—even absent exercising that right—
to control the manners and means of services performed; and requiring 
services to be rendered by the worker and not an agent of the worker.193  
Similarly to the economic realities test, the court must examine “all the 
circumstances attendant to the actual performance of the work.”194   
2. Outside the Usual Course of Business or Business 
Premises 
The second factor, “B,” under New Jersey law, contains two 
disjunctive sub-factors.195  Proof of either sub-factor satisfies the entire 
B-prong.196  B’s first sub-factor requires the putative employer to show 
that the worker is performing services outside of her “usual course of 
business.”197  For example, if a bakery that sells custom cakes hired a 
plumber to fix a leaking pipe, it is fair to say that the plumber is acting 
“outside” the bakery’s usual course of business.198  For a bakery which 
sells custom cakes, the usual course of business relates to the labor in 
making cakes.199  So, if a bakery were to hire a cake-decorator to work 
on the bakery’s custom cakes, the cake-decorator would be working 
within the bakery’s usual course of business.200   
B’s second sub-factor requires the employer to prove that the 
services performed occurred outside of all business premises.201  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court has found, in the unemployment 
compensation context, that “business premises” encompasses either 
locations in which a putative employer has a “physical plant” or 
 
Board’s reasoning, stating that “[u]nder the Board’s analysis, a paralegal could never be 
an independent contractor.”).  
 193 MKI Assocs., LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., No. A-4508-17T3, 2019 
N.J. Super. LEXIS 2088, at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 10, 2019). 
	 194	 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 314. 
 195 Unlike California’s version of the ABC test, New Jersey’s “B” factor is narrower by 
also allowing the prong to be satisfied if all work is done outside the putative employer’s 
business premises. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6)(B), with Dynamex Operations 
W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 40 (2018) (California does not include “outside all 
business premises” as a disjunctive sub-factor within the B-prong.). 
 196 Morales v. V.M. Trucking, LLC, No. A-2898-16T4, 2019 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1567, at 
*16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 9, 2019) (modeling application on unemployment 
compensation jurisprudence). 
 197 N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6)(B). 
	 198	 Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37. 
	 199	 Id. 
	 200	 Id. 
 201 Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 305 (2015) (the Court did not expand on 
this requirement substantively; the Appellate Division provides more guidance applying 
the ABC test after Hargrove.); see	 also S. 4204, 218th Leg. § 2.4.b (N.J. 2019), 
https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2018/Bills/S4500/4204_I1.HTM (proposing to remove 
the second sub-factor of the B-prong entirely). 
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“conducts an integral part of its business.”202  A business premise where 
a putative employer “conducts an integral part of its business” does not 
necessarily have to be owned by the putative employer or put out to the 
world as its place of business.203  For example, in MKI	Associates.,	LLC	v.	
N.J.	Dep’t	of	Labor	&	Workforce	Dev., the Appellate Division found that 
separate and unrelated healthcare facilities were premises that the 
putative employer “conduct[ed] an integral part of its business.”204  The 
court considered “providing therapy services” to be the “principal part” 
of MKI’s business.205  Therefore, the healthcare facilities became 
business premises because supplying therapists to work there was 
“providing therapy services,” which was an integral part of MKI’s 
business.206   
3. Customarily Independent Trades or Businesses 
The final factor, “C,” is concerned with whether the work itself is 
“customarily” considered an “independently established trade, 
occupation, profession or business.”207  This factor does not identify 
classes of professions that one might colloquially imagine as 
independent contractors and then compiling a list of those exempted.208  
Instead, the employer must prove that a worker-in-question has a 
“profession that will plainly persist despite the termination of the 
challenged relationship.”209  Similar to the economic-realities test, the 
simple label of “independent contractor” is not enough to satisfy this 
 
 202 MKI Assocs., LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., No. A-4508-17T3, 2019 
N.J. Super. LEXIS 2088, at *14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 10, 2019) (quoting	Carpet 
Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor, 125 N.J. 567, 592 (1991)). 
	 203	 Id.	at *15. 
	 204	 Id. 
	 205	 Id. 
	 206	 Id. 
 207 N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6)(C); see	also S. 4204, 218th Leg. § 2.4.c (N.J. 2019) 
(proposing to broaden the C-prong by requiring the employer to prove that the 
customarily independent established trade must be “of	the	same	nature	as	that	involved	
in	the	work	performed”	(emphasis added)). 
 208 Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 306 (2015). But	see Dynamex Operations 
W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 37 (2018) (citing plumbers and electricians as 
“traditional” independent contractors); Law Office of Gerard C. Vince, LLC v. Bd. of 
Review, No. A-5441-17T2, 2019 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1846, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Sep. 3, 2019) (contemplating that paralegals can be either employees or independent 
contractors). 
	 209	 Compare Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 306 (determining whether an enterprise exists or 
will exist independent of the service relationship), with Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 39 
(determining whether a worker has “independently chosen the burdens of self-
employment”). 
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prong.210  The actual circumstances of the work must be considered.211  
Put differently, courts will not find this prong to be satisfied if 
termination of the relationship will leave the worker in the “ranks of the 
unemployed.”212  Factors for determining whether a profession will 
survive termination of the challenged relationship include: the number 
of customers besides the putative employer the worker has in the same 
line of business, whether the worker has any employees, and the extent 
that the worker owns equipment or capital resources.213  These factors 
speak to the “strength” of the worker’s trade.214  Where the employer 
makes up a small portion of the worker’s compensation, it cuts toward 
an independent trade or business.215   
V. EASY AS 1, 2, 3: EXPANDING THE ABC TEST TO JOINT-EMPLOYMENT	
The Access	Bio	court’s holding that “the [Hargrove] Court did not 
make [the adoption of the ABC test] . . . applicable to all employment 
status disputes under the WHL . . . , but rather focused on the distinction 
between an employee and an independent contractor[,]” draws a line 
between single employment cases and joint-employment cases for the 
application of the ABC test.216  But this line drawing raises the obvious 
question: how does one draw such a line in practice?217  The first part of 
the employment inquiry determines whether a worker is an employee 
or independent contractor.218  But to determine whether a worker is an 
employee under any test—ABC, economic-realities, or even the right-to-
control—there must be at least one identifiable putative employer.   
For example, the control principle articulated in any of the tests 
asks whether there was a degree of control over the worker.219  But who 
is the one exercising the control?  It is impossible to answer the first 
 
	 210	 Law	Office	of	Gerard	C.	Vince, 2019 LEXIS 1846, at *8 . 
	 211	 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 314. 
	 212	 Id. at 306. 
 213 MKI Assocs., LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., No. A-4508-17T3, 2019 
N.J. Super. LEXIS 2088, at *15-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 10, 2019). 
	 214	 Id. 
	 215	 Id. 
 216 Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17 (Super. Ct. 
App. Div. July 23, 2019) (emphasis added). 
 217 For example, under the FLSA, only the economic-realities test applies regardless 
of single or joint-employment allegations.  Compare	Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 
757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985), with	In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices 
Litig., 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012) (both applying the economic-realities test, in single 
and joint-employment contexts respectively, although each court focuses on different 
factors in application). 
 218 Glynn, supra	note 66, at 109. 
	 219	 See	discussion supra Section III.A & IV.  
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inquiry of employment without necessarily implicating the second.  The 
two inquiries are two sides of the same coin.  Therefore, in the actual 
application of a joint-employment case under Access	Bio, at least one 
putative employer must be subjected to the ABC test, while additional 
putative joint-employers are subjected to the economic-realities test.  
This employment liability regime has numerous flaws that lend itself to 
overruling Access	 Bio and expanding the ABC test from simply 
determining whether a worker is an employee or independent 
contractor to identifying which parties are liable as joint-employers.   
A. The	Hierarchical	Problem	of	Two	Tests	for	Employment	
By applying either the ABC test or the economic-realities test to 
different putative employers depending on where they stand to a 
putative employee, the Access	Bio court creates a distinction between 
“primary” and “secondary” employers.220  But how does one determine 
which entity is the “primary” employer in this scenario, to be subjected 
to the ABC test, and which are the “secondary” employers, to be 
subjected to the economic-realities test?221  Should this determination 
be made by contractual relationship, or which putative employer pays 
employment taxes?222  Such a threshold analysis of determining which 
entity will be subject to the ABC test and which entities will be subject 
to the economic-realities test is inconsistent with the statutory language 
of the NJWPL.   
The NJWPL provides that employer liability is attached to any 
entity “employing any person.”223  Accordingly, a person who is	employed 
is anyone “suffered or permitted to work by an employer,” excluding 
independent contractors.224  Under Access	Bio, the phrase “employing” 
must inescapably have two meanings, one for the employer and one for 
 
 220 As an analogue, a California appellate court expressly embraced the concept of 
“primary” and “secondary” employers in a case limiting the application of the ABC test 
in joint-employment context similar to Access	Bio.  Curry v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC, 23 
Cal. App. 5th 289, 314 (2018). 
 221 In both Access	 Bio and Curry, the “primary” employer was determined by 
stipulation.  Neither court addresses a situation where a court must distinguish a 
“primary” employer from a “secondary” employer without a party stipulation.  
 222 The Curry court stated in dicta that which party pays employment taxes justifies 
not applying the stricter ABC test to additional putative employers because employees 
are protected by California’s wage order against at least one employer.  Curry, 23 Cal. 
App. 5th at 314.  The court did not consider or discuss how such a threshold analysis 
would occur if there was no stipulated employer.  Indeed, the Curry court’s reasoning 
has been criticized where no defendants admit employer liability.  See,	e.g., Moreno v. 
JCT Logistics, Inc., No. EDCV 17-2489 JGB (KKx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117342, at *17–
18 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2019). 
 223 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(a) (2020).	
 224 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(b) (2020). 
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additional joint-employers.225  Such a construction creates a hierarchy 
among potential joint-employers, where only one putative employer is 
subjected to broader employment liability while others are not.  This 
construction is inconsistent with the statutory language.   
Suffer-or-permit-to-work employment was crafted to prevent 
employers from circumventing child labor laws through the use of 
“agents, independent contractors, subsidiary or controlled companies, 
or home or off-premise employees, or by any other means or device.”226  
As Judge Cardozo stated in Sheffield	Farms, an employer’s duty is “non-
delegable” and he must “stand or fall with those whom he selects to act 
for him.”227  Therefore, the plain language of suffer-or-permit-to-work 
itself exists to implicate multiple potential employers.   
Further, looking to the federal regulation’s interpretation of the 
FLSA for guidance, it does not describe putative joint-employers in 
terms of a “primary” or “secondary” relationship to each other.228  The 
regulation states that “two or more employers” may be held jointly 
liable for all of a particular employee’s work, not “one or more additional 
joint-employers.”229  Under the NJWHL, an “employer” can include 
anyone “acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee,” which perfectly mirrors the FLSA’s “employer” 
definition.230  None of the statutory language of the NJWPL, NJWHL, or 
the FLSA, nor the FLSA’s regulation, interpret suffer-or-permit-to-work 
to distinguish multiple employers in hierarchical terms as the Access	Bio 
ruling necessarily creates.231  A “joint-employer” is not a different type 
of employer, but simply another employer.  An employer is anyone 
“employing” any person, which includes those suffered or permitted to 
 
 225 Although the Access	Bio court did not expand on this, the Curry	court stated: “In 
the joint employment context, the alleged employee is already considered an employee 
of the primary employer; the issue is whether the employee is also an employee of the 
alleged secondary employer.”  23 Cal. App. 5th at 314.  Therefore, the ABC test is applied 
to the primary employer and the economic-realities test is applied to the secondary 
employer.	
 226 Goldstein, et al., supra	note 28, at 1100-01. 
 227 People ex rel. v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 30 (1918). 
	 228	 See	29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2020). 
	 229	 Id. 
	 230	 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a1(g) (2020) with 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(d) (2020).  
Importantly, the Hargrove	 court held that the WHL and the WPL’s definition of 
“employee” and “employment” should equally apply the ABC test due to their similarity 
of language. Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 316 (2015).	
 231 Or as the Curry	court expressly embraces. Curry v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC, 23 
Cal. App. 5th 289, 314 (2018). 
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work.232  Therefore, all potential employers, whether “primary” or 
“secondary,” should be identified by the ABC test.233   
B. The	Statutory	Failure	of	Applying	the	Economic	Realities	Test 
Even if a two-test framework for determining joint-employment 
was statutorily acceptable or practically workable, the application of the 
economic-realities test is problematic and should be replaced by the 
ABC test.  Although the economic-realities test has dominated the 
application of the FLSA for the past eighty years, Judge Easterbrook 
found in 1987 that the test was unsatisfactory.234  Judge Easterbrook 
urged that courts should abandon the “unfocused factors” of the 
economic-realities test and start again from the statute itself: 
It is comforting to know that “economic reality” is the 
touchstone. One cringes to think that courts might decide 
these cases on the basis of economic fantasy. But “reality” 
encompasses millions of facts, and unless we have a legal rule 
with which to sift the material from the immaterial, we might 
as well examine the facts through a kaleidoscope.235 
The economic-realities test, as a legal	rule, fails because the test’s 
actual application by the circuit courts does not reflect the statutory 
language of “suffer or permit to work.”   
When Congress enacted the FLSA and suffer-or-permit-to-work 
employment, it had Judge Cardozo’s judicial interpretation in mind.236  
The language, written passively, could sweep up any work done for an 
employer’s benefit.237  Despite the remedial purpose of the act, the 
circuit courts have shown a deep reluctance to go beyond the 
touchstone of control for determining the “economic reality” of an 
employment relationship.238  This reluctance seems to come from the 
tort origins of common law employment.239  Agency law principles were 
developed to determine where a particular chain of vicarious liability 
 
 232 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(b) (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a1(g) (2020). 
	 233	 See,	e.g., Moreno v. JCT Logistics, Inc., No. EDCV 17-2489 JGB (KKx), 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 117342, at *17–18 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2019) (The court criticized the Curry	court’s 
rationale because none of the putative employer defendants admitted employment 
liability.  “The Dynamex court later adopted the ABC test to interpret the ‘suffer or permit 
to work’ standard. As Plaintiff points out, ‘Dynamex held that the ABC test applied to the 
suffer or permit to work definition as to all	workers.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 234 Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Easterbrook, J. concurring). 
	 235	 Id. 
 236 Goldstein, et al., supra	note 28, at 1101. 
	 237	 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1543 (Easterbrook, J. concurring). 
 238 Glynn, supra	note 66, at 117. 
	 239	 See	discussion supra at Section III.A.  
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should end when dealing with torts committed by agents.240  Yet, this 
underlying principle has nothing to do with the purposes of FLSA or 
similar suffer-or-permit-to-work regimes.241  Rutherford, the progenitor 
of all the myriad economic-realities tests that have been propagated by 
the circuit courts, illuminates this purpose clearly: “the [FLSA] concerns 
itself with the correction of economic	evils through remedies which were 
unknown	at	common	law.”242   
Moreover, a cursory review of the factors considered in the Second 
or Third Circuit’s leading economic-realities cases show an eerie 
similarity between the right-to-control test as articulated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency.243  The Restatement provides that the 
analysis must consider the totality-of-the-circumstances, with no one 
factor being dispositive or even necessary.244  These factors include, but 
are not limited to: (1) the extent of supervision and physical control over 
the manner and means of the service; (2) the skill required; (3) the use 
of the putative employer’s equipment and premises; (4) the length of 
time the person is employed; and (5) the terms of compensation.245  In 
Zheng, the court chose to focus on similar factors such as: (1) the use of 
the putative employer’s equipment and premise, and (2) the degree of 
supervision by the putative employer over the workers.246  Enterprise	
focused on other similar factors including: (1) the ability to hire and fire, 
(2) the degree of supervision, and (3) the ability to set the terms of 
compensation and services.247  The Enterprise court did not even 
consider “economic integration”248 or the ability for the workers to 
 
	 240	 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1544 (Easterbrook, J. concurring). 
	 241	 Id. 
 242 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947) (emphasis added).	
 243 The Enterprise	version of the economic-realities test stands on particularly shaky 
grounds because the Third Circuit heavily relied on the Ninth Circuit’s “Bonnette	
factors.”  These four exhaustive factors were: (1) the power to hire and fire, (2) 
supervision or control of employment conditions, (3) determination of wages, and (4) 
maintaining employment records.  The Ninth Circuit held in later cases that these factors 
are too narrow to be consistent with Rutherford.  Norton, supra	note 13, at 17-18. 
	 244	 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1958) with 
Rutherford	Food	Corp., 331 U.S. at 730 (“[T]he determination of the relationship does not 
depend on . . . isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole	activity.”).	
 245 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a)-(g)(a). 
 246 Such factors would be compatible under the right-to-control test because no 
single or specific group of factors listed within the Restatement is dispositive or 
necessary for determining an employment relationship. Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty 
Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 247 In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  
	 248	 See	discussion supra Section 2. 
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perform work for other businesses like the Zheng court.249  This 
similarity between the right-to-control test and the economic-realities 
test has led some courts to argue that the tests are functionally the same 
thing.250   
The rise of the ABC test presents an opportunity to follow Judge 
Easterbrook’s suggestion and abandon the “unfocused factors” of the 
economic-realities test and follow the statutory language’s expansion 
beyond the touchstone of control.  Unlike the Third Circuit’s economic-
realities test, the ABC test is plainly different than the right-to-control 
test.  The ABC test requires the satisfaction of three clearly delineated 
factors and only one of the three factors considers the element of 
control.251  Moreover, the test is concerned with a worker’s freedom 
from control.252  This approach also satisfies the plain meaning of both 
“suffer” and “permit.”  Written in the passive, both terms denote 
something less than control.  Therefore, a	 fortiori, a definition that 
requires the showing of no	control, satisfies such a standard.   
The test also considers the “economic realities” of the whole 
activity in prongs B and C.  The “usual course of business” and 
“traditionally independent trade” prongs more fully encompasses the 
“economic integration” or “dependence” concepts that are articulated 
by the circuit courts.253  If the work done is performed outside the usual 
course of business, it is likely not a permanent relationship nor can the 
work be integral to the putative employer’s business.  A plumber, who 
works in a traditionally independent trade, does not maintain a 
permanent relationship with a cake shop, nor does her plumbing form 
an integral part of the cake shop’s business.254  Likewise, the plumber 
will continue in her profession after her relationship to the cake shop 
has ended.  Moreover, by shifting the focus onto the putative employer’s 
actions, the test honors Judge Cardozo’s maxim: that liability attaches to 
a putative employer for the “non-performance of a non-delegable 
duty.”255  Therefore, the ABC test should be expanded to joint-
 
	 249	 Compare In	re	Enter., 683 F.3d at 469-70 with Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72-74. 
 250 GLYNN, supra note 105 (citing Murray	v.	Principal	Fin.	Group,	Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 
945 (9th Cir. 2010)); Glynn, supra	note 66, at 135 n. 69. 
	 251	 See	N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)-(C).	
 252 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-19(i)(6)(A). 
	 253	 See	 discussion supra	 Section 2 (The court in DialAmerica focused on the 
permanence of the putative employer-employee relationship as well as the integration 
of the worker’s labor to the employer’s business to determine the level of worker 
“dependence.”). 
	 254	 See	discussion supra	Section 2 (Plumbers are the quintessential example of an 
independent contractor not typically covered by the ABC test.). 
 255 People ex rel. v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 30 (1918). 
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employment cases because it precisely overcomes the flaws of the 
economic-realities test.   
C. The	Economic	Realities	Test	Fails	the	Remedial	Purpose	of	
the	NJWPL	
Judge Easterbrook also found the economic-realities test leaves 
workers “in the dark about the legal consequences of their deeds.”256  
From a policy perspective, a totality-of-the-circumstances approach 
leaves every analysis on a case-by-case basis, regardless of whether 
there are “recurring fact patterns.”257  This vague and amorphous 
approach can also lead to wildly varying outcomes.258  With every circuit 
court’s list of factors, none being individually dispositive, nor any list 
exhaustive, the harm caused by the economic-realities test’s application 
goes beyond the frustration of lawyers and judges.259  Because of the 
costs of litigation, this approach chills the ability for workers to exercise 
the rights owed to them under such employment statutes that use the 
economic-realities test like the FLSA.  Indeed, this problem occurs for 
any totality-of-the-circumstances test, including the right-to-control 
test.260   
When adopting the ABC test, the Hargrove	court directly addressed 
this flaw in totality-of-the-circumstances tests.261  The court emphasized 
the remedial nature of both the FLSA and the NJWPL.262  Such 
regulations strike at the “fundamental terms of the employment 
relationship.”263  These wage protection laws were passed to provide 
workers with income security and a private means of action to protect 
that right.264  Expanded employment coverage is crucial to effectuate 
that purpose.265  How can the statute achieve its remedial goals where 
no worker can know with any degree of certainty whether she is entitled 
 
 256 Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Easterbrook, J. concurring). 
	 257	 See	id. 
 258 Glynn, supra	note 66, at 117. 
	 259	 See	discussion supra Section 1. Even where both the Zheng and Enterprise courts 
appear to use control as the touchstone for the factors to apply, both courts come to rely 
on different factors. Compare In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 
683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2012), with Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 
61, 72-74 (2d Cir. 2003).	
	 260	 See Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 316 (2015). 
	 261	 Id.	at 313-16.	
	 262	 Id. 
	 263	 Id. at 313. 
	 264	 Id. at 313-16. 
	 265	 See Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544 (7th Cir. 
1987) (Easterbrook, J. concurring) (“The functions of the FLSA call for coverage.”). 
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to the right of a minimum wage or overtime payment in a fissured 
workplace?  How can a worker have income security if her rights change 
from case to case depending on where her multiple putative employers 
stand to	each	other?  A case-by-case analysis considering anything and 
everything about the employment relationship is inherently incapable 
of fulfilling such a purpose.   
The application of an economic-realities test as a substitute in 
joint-employment cases neuters the effectiveness and purpose of the 
ABC test.  Applying the economic-realities test to “secondary” putative 
employers’ functionally limits those employers’ liability due to the high 
costs for employees litigating such a fact-sensitive case-by-case 
analysis.266  This framework encourages leading firms to shield 
themselves from the ABC test by placing one or more third-party 
“secondary” employers in between the leading firms and workers—
their sacrificial lambs.267  And with each layer of separation comes 
increasing competition between the third-party labor providers, which 
drives wage violations due to the difficulty of enforcement and third-
party undercapitalization.268   
The Enterprise version of the economic-realities test demands an 
exacting degree of employer control, including the ability to hire and 
fire, maintain employment records, and control day-to-day work.269  The 
Access	Bio construction leaves a large gap between workers who would 
otherwise qualify as the leading firms’ employees under the ABC test270 
but are not significantly controlled by the leading firm as the Enterprise	
standard demands.  Workers within this gap have no recourse if the 
“primary” employer is judgment-proof.271  The Access	Bio construction 
 
	 266	 See	Glynn, supra	note 66, at 117 (discussing the difficulty of bringing private suit 
or public enforcement for employment law violations). 
	 267	 See	Goldstein, et al., supra	 note 28, at 997-99 (1999) (noting that sweatshop 
jobbers assume employment liability for the leading firm in order to take the fall). 
	 268	 See	discussion supra	Section II. 
 269 In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d 
Cir. 2012). See	also supra	note 243 for the critique of Enterprise’s particular factors for 
hewing too close to the right-to-control test. 
 270 Where a worker is not free from the control of the leading firm, works within the 
leading firm’s usual course of business and within its business premises, or whose work 
is not traditionally an independent trade. See	discussion supra	Section B. 
 271 The Curry	court stated, “the policy purpose for presuming the worker to be an 
employee and requiring the secondary employer to disprove the worker’s status as an 
employee is unnecessary in that taxes are being paid and the worker has employment 
protections.” But the court does not consider or discuss whether the ABC test’s policy 
purpose for broad coverage is unnecessary where there is a judgment-proof “primary” 
employer, particularly when acting in the interest of a “secondary” employer. Curry v. 
Equilon Enterprises, LLC, 23 Cal. App. 5th 289, 314 (2018); see	also discussion	supra	
Section II. 
PERALTA  (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2021  3:07 PM 
2021]	 COMMENT 293 
of suffer-or-permit-to-work, which was crafted to prevent such 
carefully evasive workplace structuring, is susceptible to the same game 
of Whac-a-Mole that plagues wage and hour law enforcement.272  
Therefore, overruling the Access	Bio framework to expand the ABC test 
to joint-employment is critical to fulfilling the remedial purpose of the 
NJWPL.  The ABC test best embodies the broad employment coverage 
provided by the statutory language of suffer-or-permit-to-work 
employment.  The ABC test also provides workers with greater income 
security by facilitating enforcement against those leading firms that 
drive wage protection violations.   
VI. CONCLUSION	
Limiting the ABC test to the distinction between employee and 
independent contractor status represents a significant obstacle to the 
NJWPL’s statutory effectiveness and purpose.  This approach leaves a 
sizeable gap in the law’s enforcement because of the workplace fissuring 
that dominates business organization today.  By bounding the ABC test 
to only single employment scenarios, only one potential putative 
employer is subject to the broad scope of the ABC test in joint-
employment cases.  This limitation encourages leading firms to continue 
to shed employment liability by placing sacrificial lamb “primary” 
employers in between themselves and their workers.  This hierarchical 
framework is untenable under the statutory language of the NJWPL, 
which calls for broad coverage and does not differentiate joint 
employers in terms of coverage liability.   
The economic-realities test that the Access	Bio	court adopts in place 
of the ABC test is likewise inconsistent with the statutory language of 
the NJWPL.  This test hews too closely to the common law focus on 
control, which suffer-or-permit-to-work employment was crafted to 
move beyond.  The limitation of the ABC test and the application of the 
economic-realities test fails to fulfill the NJWPL’s statutory purpose.  
This failure leaves workers vulnerable to the precise problem that the 
statute was meant to prevent.  Overruling the Access	Bio framework is 
crucial to the material fulfillment of the NJWPL’s statutory purpose.  
Expanding the ABC test to joint-employment cases will give workers and 
employment law enforcement a powerful tool to focus on the top level 
firms that drive violations and remedy the gap left by the Access	Bio	
court’s holding.   
 
 
	 272	 See	discussion supra	Section B.  
